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In this submission I use previously published works, my book Rethinking Residential 
Child Care and two articles ‘Reading Bauman for Social Work’ and ‘Care Ethics in 
Residential Child Care: A Different Voice’, to develop a critical account of changing 
rationalities of care in the context of residential child care. Much of my writing 
draws upon professional experience gained over 20 years of residential child care 
practice and I begin this account by justifying the use of this experience as the basis 
of professional and academic knowledge. I then go on to explicate some of the 
discursive influences that have fed into the way that residential child care is currently 
constituted. Specifically, I locate many current assumptions and practices within 
dominant neoliberal political systems and assumptions. This has led to the 
commodification, instrumentalisation and, within an increasingly regulated polity, 
the bureaucratisation of public care. Against this backdrop, public care is conceived 
of in narrow and abstract concerns around rights and protection. The concepts of care 
itself and of upbringing that ought to be at the heart of adult engagement with 
children are left, largely, unarticulated. I seek to address this gap by developing 
possible conceptualisations of care and upbringing. I conclude by arguing that 
residential child care and, indeed, much public care, is governed by the wrong 
rationalities, by economic and administrative priorities rather than caring and 
relational ones. Finally, I suggest some directions that future work might take. 
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This critical review focuses on residential child care, my field of professional 
practice and academic study. It is, primarily, a reflexive account of my book 
Rethinking Residential Child Care (RRCC) (Smith, 2009). The book falls 
somewhere between a textbook and a theoretical exposition of residential child care. 
I have developed some of the book’s subject matter in different places and forms and 
this, inevitably, finds its way, in some shape or form into this narrative1. For the 
purpose of this review, I include two articles, ‘Reading Bauman for Social Work’ 
and ‘Care Ethics in Residential Child Care: A Different Voice’, both published in 
2011 in the journal Ethics and Social Welfare to support my central argument. I am 
sole author on the first of these and co-author with Laura Steckley on the second. 
Relative contribution on this was around equal. 
 
Lofland and Lofland (1995) suggest that the best research is located in the 
biographies of its creators and reflects their emotional involvement in the process. 
The writing that forms the basis of this submission is embedded, and arguably 
embodied, within my own practice experience in residential child care over a period 
of almost 20 years. My arguments draw on that experience melded with academic 
knowledge developed over twelve years as an academic. As I acknowledge in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  example,	  sections	  of	  the	  chapter	  on	  the	  history	  of	  residential	  child	  care	  
draw	  on	  material	  in	  Smith,	  M.	  Fulcher,	  L.	  and	  Doran,	  P.	  (2013)	  Residential	  
child	  care	  in	  practice:	  Making	  a	  difference,	  Bristol:	  Policy	  Press.	  I	  was	  main	  
originator.	  
Some	  of	  the	  material	  on	  upbringing	  is	  to	  appear	  in	  a	  sole	  authored	  article	  in	  a	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Introduction to the book, my entire career has been spent in Scotland and primarily 
in residential school settings. “I hope and suspect however that the broad trends I 
identify and address will, nevertheless, have a resonance across different settings and 
across the different countries of the UK and indeed further afield”. (RRCC, 2009: 
xiii)   
 
The first chapter provides a justification for my approach in submitting this thesis for 
examination. The second seeks to understand recent policy and discursive 
developments in residential child care, locating these within the context of neoliberal 
reforms over the course of the last thirty years or so. Chapter Three develops a 
theoretical exposition of ideas of care and upbringing, concepts that one might 
expect to be at the heart of state care but which remain largely untheorised. Chapter 
Four draws together some of the central themes of the thesis, making the case that 
care and upbringing are value rational and practical rational endeavours rather than 
the technical rational ones they have become in dominant ways of thinking. I 
conclude by suggesting some directions for future work. 
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Chapter One: Aims, objectives and methodology 
 
Aims and Objectives 
 
My aim in this review is to explore a central assertion in my book summarised on its 
back cover, where I argue that residential child care “needs to move beyond 





My approach in this proposal is not what might be thought of as research within 
dominant positivist or ‘evidence-based’ paradigms. It invites criticism in traditional 
academic circles where claims to pass off accounts of lived experience as research 
are typically perceived not to conform to standards of intellectual rigour because of 
the ‘insider’s’ personal and emotional investment in the setting and their consequent 
difficulty achieving detachment and objectivity (Alvesson, 2003). This is a legitimate 
concern; there is no doubt that a degree of subjectivity enters into the way I think 
about and present my experience. On the other hand, to dismiss the ‘lived’ dimension 
of what I bring to the field negates the richness and complexity of insider knowledge. 
Insiders, according to Brannick and Coughlan “are able to articulate tacit knowledge 
that has become deeply segmented because of socialization in an organizational 
system and reframe it as theoretical knowledge” (2007: 60). The same authors argue 
that, rather than neglecting at-hand knowledge or expertise, researchers should turn 
familiar situations, timely events or special expertise into objects of study. Such 
reflection on experience should not be excluded from being considered research and 
can, I argue, be justified within a broadly hermeneutic tradition. To make this case 
requires a brief survey of what Flyvbjerg (2001) identifies as the science wars 
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Ontology 
Ontology concerns the nature of the world and what we can know about it. 
Essentially, ontological stances can assume either objectivist or constructionist 
starting points. Objectivism (or realism) assumes an external reality, which exists 
independently of our beliefs about it. Constructionism on the other hand, assumes 
that knowledge and meanings are socially constructed and that reality is multi-
faceted and contingent. Realist research valorises the ‘voice from nowhere’ - the 
dispassionate observer of a normative human condition. Within this tradition the 
ability of the researcher to demonstrate objectivity and value-neutrality is a central 
measure of the quality of their research. By contrast, constructionist ontological 
perspectives, which acknowledge a plurality of human realities, deny that a 
researcher can stand above the object (or subject) of their research activity.  
 
Epistemology 
Epistemology concerns the nature of knowledge. Particular ontological views have 
implications for the epistemological position a researcher might adopt. Ritchie and 
Lewis (2003) differentiate between positivist and interpretivist positions. The former, 
deriving from an objectivist ontology, posits that research can be objective and 
value-free. This draws on the Cartesian duality of the early Enlightenment, which 
assumes that we can separate our rational, thinking selves from our sentient, 
emotional selves and that the former be privileged over the latter. This assertion of 
human rationality was perhaps the predominant feature of Enlightenment thought, 
finding its apogee in the work of Kant who maintained reason to be the arbiter of 
truth in all judgments (Williams, 2013). 
 
An interpretivist position starts from the premise that wholly objective research is 
impossible and that researchers inevitably react with and influence the social world 
that is the subject of their research. According to Denzin and Lincoln the “concept of 
the aloof researcher has been abandoned” (1998: 22). Rather, every researcher 
speaks from within a distinct interpretive community. Vivat argues that knowledge is 
inevitably and unavoidably produced within a social and cultural context (2002). 
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Methodology in the positivist paradigm seeks to ensure that research findings can be 
presented as contamination free and context neutral. Observation, measurement, 
experiment and theory building are its cornerstones. This fundamentally differs from 
methodology in the interpretivist paradigm where the task of verification is entrusted 
to the expertise and insight of the investigator. His or her interpretation is proposed 
to lead to levels of new understanding. “Knowledge becomes valid only when people 
find it meaningful to them and want to use it” (Payne and Askeland 2008: 67). 
 
Social Work Research 
While qualitative and constructionist methodologies have become more sophisticated 
and better accepted in the past few decades in the social sciences, much of the focus 
of social work research has continued to draw, largely, on realist ontological 
assumptions and positivist methodologies (White, 1997) often designed to support an 
evidence-based-practice paradigm. To some extent, this tendency reflects social 
work’s journey towards professionalisation and its search for a knowledge base that 
might be accepted by other ‘purer’ professions such as law and medicine. This has 
led it in the direction of method and technique, its mode of consciousness, largely 
technocratic.  As Sewpaul notes: 
 
Born within the period of modernity ... social work began to take on the 
omniscient voice of science . . . It is within this culture of cure and control that the 
discipline has seen its most pronounced development ... Given its birth during the 
period of modernity with its emphasis on reductionist, logical positivist rationality 
... social work took on this dominant discourse in the pursuit of status and 
professionalism (2005: 211). 
 
Approaches to knowledge construction in social work often fail to address 
fundamental epistemological questions, a failure closely linked to the anti-
intellectual traditions of the professional mainstream (Trinder, 1996). White 
identifies a tendency in much social work research to render sense-making activities 
“immune from critical analysis” (1997: 739). Over the course of the 1990s and 
indeed beyond, most research into residential child care, in the elusive pursuit of 
‘evidence’, sought to apply standard and unimaginative methodologies, which 
seemed to succeed only in describing what, to most practitioners, was blindingly 
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obvious. Instrumental answers were applied to complex social problems with little 
sign of any deeper analysis of what was going on or any wider concern for social 
justice. Moreover, many social work academics and professionals seemed too 
concerned in Dingwall’s (1997) terms, to be seen to be ‘right on’ rather than ‘right’ 
in what they had to say and as a result failed to subject developments in residential 
child care to sufficiently critical analysis. Two examples come to mind: the first of 
these concerns the subject of historical abuse, which I return to; the second to 
debates around residential care’s poor outcomes which, as Forrester (2008) indicates, 
is based on shaky methodological foundations. Specifically, there is little in the 
mainstream social work literature that theorises or sets residential child care in wider 
social scientific context. 
 
The quest by people professions such as social work to achieve recognition and 
status through an appeal to the precepts of the natural sciences or positivist notions of 
evidence is, Flyvbjerg argues, fundamentally misconceived. He contends in his case 
for phronetic social science (of which more later) that: 
 
1. We should avoid social sciences that pretend to emulate natural science by 
producing cumulative and predictive theory. The natural science approach simply 
does not work in the social sciences. No predictive theories have been arrived at 
in social science, despite centuries of trying. This approach is a wasteful dead-
end. 
2. We should promote social sciences that are strong where natural science is 
weak – that is, in reflexive analysis and deliberation about values and interests 
aimed at praxis, which are essential to social and economic development in 
society. We should promote value rationality over epistemic rationality, in order 
to arrive at social science that matters (2006: 38). 
 
Whose side am I on? 
My own ontological and epistemological position has over time become decidedly 
constructionist. Anyone who has worked in social work for any length of time cannot 
fail to be aware of the plurality of human experience and indeed the damage that can 
be caused by attempts to impose ‘objective’ and normative assumptions upon it. 
Moreover, the claim to speak with a voice uncontaminated by personal and political 
sympathies is often used in research to shore up the status quo. Becker states the 
classic case for partisan research, arguing that “there is no position from which 
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sociological research can be done that is not biased in one way or another” (1967: 
245). My particular bias in writing about residential child care derives from my 
practice experience and a desire to ensure that what comes to pass for knowledge 
about the field is at least vaguely recognisable to those who worked in it. I also want 
to contribute to research that does not pretend to be value neutral but, as Flyvbjerg 
(2006) asserts, is based upon value rationality and seeks to be of some use in its 
interface with practice. 
 
I now proceed to make a case that lived experience can and indeed ought to be 
accepted as a legitimate source of knowledge. In seeking to do so, all roads seem to 
lead back to Aristotle, or at least to writers who draw upon Aristotle (see Dunne, 
1993). Prominent among these neo-Aristotelians is Hans Georg Gadamer and his 




The origin of hermeneutic inquiry is in the interpretation of biblical texts. It thus 
emphasises qualities of interpretation and understanding. To reach a state of 
understanding is likened to a reflective discovery of sorts (Holroyd, 2007), one that 
is very different from Enlightenment inspired attempts to attain objectified 
knowledge and certainty through scientific method. Hermeneutics extend backwards 
beyond the Enlightenment’s quest for rational and objective knowledge and as such 
challenge this central premise of the Enlightenment project. It is both pre-modern but 
also, curiously, postmodern. Gadamer’s most famous book, Truth and Method 
(2004) explores this tension between truth and how we might reach a passable, if 
albeit contingent, version of it. We do not do so, he contends, through scientific 
method. 
 
While the Enlightenment privileges the objective and rational ‘voice from nowhere’, 
Gadamer claims that we cannot separate ourselves from what we already know, from 
tradition. A sense of tradition is implicated from the earliest stages of any research in 
the choice of topic. According to Bernstein, “(E)ffective historical consciousness 
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influences what we consider worthy of investigation and how we go about 
investigating it” (1983: 142). The prejudices or pre-understandings that come along 
with our being in the world cannot merely be acknowledged then bracketed off as 
contaminating influences upon our research but are integral to any understanding we 
might claim.  
 
Understanding, for Gadamer, is the “result of a dialogue between the past and our 
present which occurs when there is a ‘fusion of horizons’ between the two” 
(Bernstein, 1983: 91). Drawing on one’s pre-understanding becomes a matter of 
moving from closeness to distance and back again in a dialectic interplay. 
Understanding can only come about through this dialectic between past and present 
but also that operating between the particular and the general; we can only 
understand the particularities of a situation in their wider cultural and linguistic 
context. Knowledge construction is, thus, an iterative process, a hermeneutic circle 
(the term first coined by Heidegger but further developed by Gadamer). 
 
The closest we can come to ‘the truth’ comes only through “understanding (even 
mastering) and interpreting our experience” (Poulos, 2013). For Gadamer, however, 
the best that can be hoped for with experience is not knowledge in an absolute sense 
but insight (Lawn, 2006). Experience and insight combined lead to wisdom. This 
kind of understanding, grounded in tradition and experience, yields a distinctive type 
of practical knowledge and practical truth (Gadamer, 2004).  
 
Experience, however, also teaches us its own limitations, confronting us with what 
we do not know. “Insight includes insight into the fallibility of human possibilities 
and their essential limitations” (Lawn, 2006: 63). Experience and knowledge 




A hermeneutic epistemology might lend itself to autoethnographic methodology 
according to Ellis et al’s description of autoethnography as “an approach to research 
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and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyse personal experience in 
order to understand cultural experience” (2011: unpaginated). A researcher thus has 
to believe that the study of their own ‘I’ can shed light on issues of more general 
importance (Eriksson, 2010). Within autoethnography, writing itself becomes a way 
of knowing, a method of inquiry and one through which one might challenge 
canonical stories (Ellis et al, 2011). To accomplish this might require comparing and 
contrasting personal experience against existing research. This, in many senses is 
what I do with my writing, engaging in an ongoing fusing of horizons between past 
experience and developing knowledge to reach a deeper understanding of the field.   
 
Insider-outsider considerations  
 
I find myself in an ambiguous position as one who was an ‘insider’ in the residential 
child care community who has now broken out of the group to reflect back. My work 
is well received by the practice community, which recognises the tacit knowledge 
and understanding it conveys. I am still considered an ‘insider’ in that community 
and in this sense my writing might be thought to meet the standards of validity of 
qualitative research, this being an end-state, the point at which knowledge is 
accepted (Askeland and Payne, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, I am an epistemic outsider (Doucet, 2008). I am sceptical (or at 
least I perceive nuance or alternative interpretations) about the canonical stories that 
have come to define residential child care in recent decades, the subject of historical 
abuse being an obvious example but nor am I convinced by discourses of rights, 
protection or outcomes, as will become apparent as this review develops. As a result, 
my writing can be dismissed within the dominant policy and epistemic communities.  
 
Insider knowledge: a case study of historical abuse 
By way of illustration of the importance of insider understanding of professional 
practice I now turn to the situation of historical abuse in residential care. Over the 
years I have become increasingly convinced that the discovery of abuse has been the 
defining moment in the history of residential child care (see RRCC, Chapter 3). 
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Responses to abuse have defined knowledge about residential child care in a 
particular way, reflecting a legal ontology largely untouched and untroubled by 
social scientific imagination or nuance. 
 
The discourse on historic abuse, which took root over the course of the 1990s (see 
Sen et al, 2008) relies on a particular 'master narrative' around how it could occur. 
Ferguson asserts that ‘it is beyond question that the entire industrial and reformatory 
regime was an abusive and cruel one’ (2007: 124). The received wisdom may be 
summarised as follows: individuals harbouring ill intent towards children infiltrated 
care homes. They did so easily because recruitment policies were lax. Once in 
employment they were free to identify and target vulnerable children. Abuse 
remained undetected because abusers were sufficiently manipulative and deceitful to 
be able to cover up their activities. Management structures and cultures were so loose 
or corrupt that they either failed to address or covered up reports of abuse.  
 
My initial response to such a narrative was to reluctantly accept it and to reconcile 
myself that I had been fortunate in my own workplaces of not having come across 
such happenings. Nevertheless, I went through a period of personal soul-searching. 
Had residential schools been such bad places? Had people I had worked closely with 
been pulling the wool over my eyes to abuse children? Then personal experience 
kicked in. Every year, a team of boys and staff from the school where I worked over 
the course of the 1980s travelled to play football against an English Community 
Home with Education (CHE) – (the equivalent of a Scottish List D School) in 
Merseyside. Towards the end of the 1990s staff there began to be implicated in 
abuse. In all, nearly 100 staff were investigated for abusing children over previous 
decades. These developments took me by surprise. I had not been aware of anything 
untoward but my experience was limited to having spent a number of weekends 
there. 
 
Matters then reached closer to home. The De La Salle Brothers, for whom I worked, 
became implicated in the abuse of boys in their care in Scotland. Allegations 
reported in the press spoke of men in black robes indulging in gratuitous torture. I 
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knew some of those against whom the allegations were being made. I knew one of 
those making claims of abuse. He spoke of electric fences, of being forced to climb 
telegraph poles and falling and of being hit across the head so often that he lost his 
hearing. In 2003, I witnessed a former shift partner, Brother Ben, being jailed for 
allegedly electrocuting children in his care. The device in question was the 
equivalent of a Van Der Graaf generator that he used in an electronics workshop to 
demonstrate how electricity was generated. That he was prosecuted, far less 
convicted made me realise that all was not as it seemed within official accounts. 
 
I began to look into the issue of historical abuse more systematically. In doing so I 
came across the work of Richard Webster (2005) whose book, The Secret of Bryn 
Estyn, forensically deconstructs the Waterhouse Report set up by the Westminster 
Government to inquire into abuse in North Wales children’s homes. I myself and 
with colleagues have gone on to question the epistemological basis upon which 
assumptions of widespread abuse are based (Smith, 2010, Smith et al, 2012). I do not 
dispute that abuse happened in residential child care as it does wherever adults 
interact with children but I do question its scale and the proportionality of responses. 
 
The reason, it seems to me, that the kind of lurid accounts of abuse in care that have 
taken hold in the public imagination, but have also become dominant in professional 
discourse, can do so is through a lack of hermeneutic understanding of the field. 
‘Insider’ knowledge of actual situations and events allows and indeed demands that I 
question and contest accounts I know not to be true, however one might interpret 
true.  Within metanarratives of abuse and a pre-existing professional ambivalence 
towards residential care, however, a lack of grounded knowledge can encourage 
fantasising. This itself may be linked to care itself, which Tronto (1993) identifies as 
being persistently undervalued in public policy and discourse. 
 
Dominant accounts of historical abuse are constructed around a combination of fact 
and fantasy and when the two are mixed in unequal proportion, fantasy can overtake 
fact and can act to generate and intensify a particular web of belief, which becomes 
very difficult to unravel. When this happens Webster argues, “(T)here is only one 
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way to undo its influence. This is to document how the narrative which has achieved 
such power was actually created in the first place. In short, it is to tell another story - 
the story of the story (2005: 11). This requires a different type of knowledge and 
understanding of the field. 
 
 
Phronesis and phronentic social science 
 
I noted, above, a connection from Gadamer back to Aristotle, who identifies three 
main intellectual virtues: episteme, techne and phronesis. Flyvbjerg defines these, 
respectively, as follows: 
 
Episteme scientific knowledge. Universal, invariable, context-independent. Based 
on general analytic rationality. The original concept is known today from the 
terms ‘epistemology’ and ‘epistemic’. 
 
Techne Craft/art. Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented towards 
production. Based on practical instrumental rationality governed by a conscious 
goal. The original concept appears today in terms such as ‘technique’, ‘technical’ 
and ‘technology’. 
 
Phronesis Ethics. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, 
variable, context dependent. Oriented towards action. Based on practical value-
rationality. The original concept has no analogous contemporary term (2001: 57). 
 
The virtue of phronesis is central to Gadamer’s (2004) exposition of hermeneutics. 
He identifies it as the thoughtful reflection on experience. It is described elsewhere, 
variously, as prudence or practical wisdom (Whan, 1986). Aristotle associates 
phronesis specifically with moral knowledge, involving contemplation on 
Eudaimonia or ‘the good life’. It involves acting on our world (praxis) in a value 
based way as distinct from necessarily producing something (what Aristotle calls 
poiesis, which might be associated with techne). This is an important distinction and 
it is according to Flyvbjerg (2001), important to differentiate types of knowledge. 
This, however, is rarely done in professional discourse. Social work, in its quest for 
‘evidence’ has conflated and confused different types of knowledge and has sought 
to build a knowledge base, primarily, around an understanding of knowledge as 
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techne. The result of such technocratic consciousness or technical ratonality is 
instrumentalisation (Whan, 1986), within which people become objects of 
interventions done unto them (see also Bauman, 1993; 2000). 
 
Social work, however, ought to involve an element of service. According to Whan: 
Implicit in the act of service, of helping the other, is some version of the good. 
When asked to account for what one does, when asked to justify one's actions, it is 
to an idea of the good that we turn. It is by this idea of the good, then, that we 
describe the practice as what it is (1986: 244).  
 
This notion of the good, with its obvious ethical connotations, leads in the direction 
of a different form of rationality, practical or value-rationality – phronesis. Flyvbjerg  
(2001) offers a central contribution to debates about the nature of social scientific 
enquiry, advocating what he calls phronetic social science, within which, he claims: 
 
the purpose of social science is not to develop epistemic theory, but to contribute 
to society’s practical rationality by elucidating where we are, where we want to 
go, and what is desirable according to different sets of values and interests. The 
goal of the phronetic approach becomes contributing to society’s capacity for 
value-rational deliberation and action. In this scenario social scientists actively 
ensure that their work is relevant to praxis. The aim is to make the line between 
research and the world direct and consequential (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 42). 
 
Phronetic social scientists, according to Flyvbjerg “realise that as researchers, their 
sociality and history is the only solid ground under their feet; and that this socio-
historical foundation is fully adequate for their work” (2006: 41). The role of social 
science, for Flyvbjerg, is not to produce objective ‘knowledge’ but to engage in 
dialogue and praxis in the public domain. If academics are to lay claim to be 
intellectuals then they ought to aspire to be public intellectuals, seeking to achieve an 
authoritative position within a wider civitas. The basis for their knowledge in their 
own sociality and history has provoked calls for “self-reflexive modes of qualitative 
inquiry that grapple with this intersection of biography and history in society” 
(Riessman and Quinney, 2005).  
 
Moving towards reflexivity 
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The idea of reflexivity derives primarily from interpretivist traditions. The concept, 
whereby the researcher seeks to position themself in relation to their research, can be 
claimed to add an additional layer of rigour to the research process (Fook and 
Askeland, 2006).  It can help deflect some of the criticisms made of ‘insider’ 
research by subjecting it to a layer of personal examination and transparency 
regarding the influence that the positionality of the researcher might have on the 
researched. Nevertheless, reflexivity can be subject to critique as being solipsistic 
and overly confessional. More recent literature on reflexivity, however,  goes beyond 
the idea of being merely reflective, described by Woolgar (1988) as benign 
introspection, to incorporate social critique, which ‘offers the opportunity to utilise 
experiential accounts while situating these within a strong theoretical framework 
about the social construction of power’ (Finlay, 2003: 14). Taylor and White suggest 
that social workers need to become “aware of the dominant professional 
constructions influencing their practice” (2000: 35). In this context, constructs such 
as ‘rights’, protection, or outcomes must be considered only the products of 
dominant ideologies, no longer to be taken for granted but contestable and 
provisional. As such, a critically reflexive stance offers possibilities to destabilise 
dominant practice paradigms. 
 
The roots of my thinking: a reflexive journey 
 
The literature on reflexivity recognises that we bring a number of positions or 
‘selves’ to the research process and these, inevitably, influence the type of 
knowledge that we create (see Reinharz, 1997). When I left University in 1981 with 
a Modern History degree, I wanted to be a teacher. My own parents, out of economic 
necessity and social expectation, had both left school at 15, my father to become a 
painter and decorator, my mother an office worker. Looking back, both my parents 
would nowadays be identified as being ‘in need’ in some way. My paternal 
grandfather had been brought up in care, coincidentally, I later discovered, in the 
Catholic working boys’ home run by the De La Salle Brothers I later went on to 
work for. When my father’s mother died when he was 16, my grandfather was 
unable to care for him and his younger brother and they went to stay with a family 
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known to them through the Church, what would nowadays be described as informal 
fostering. On the other side, my mother’s father died suddenly when she was a baby, 
leaving her mother to bring up three children as a single parent. For much of her life, 
my gran, not surprisingly, was ‘bothered with her nerves’, what might today be 
understood as having mental health difficulties. 
 
The painting and decorating trade can call upon a unique political legacy set out in 
‘the painter’s bible’, Robert Tressell’s socialist tract, The Ragged Trousered 
Philanthropists, which recounts the experiences of painters in Edwardian Hastings 
on the South Coast of England. My father became involved in the trade union 
movement. Some of my earliest memories are of trades union or Labour Party 
Christmas parties. I have considered myself to be a socialist ever since. 
 
Despite their inauspicious starts in life, both my parents returned to further and then 
higher education to become teachers. Their life-paths, I am sure, instilled in me an 
ideal of education as being linked with personal improvement but also with social 
and class advancement. My own desire to teach, however, was not realised at that 
point. There were few openings for history teachers and, moreover, I felt I should get 
some life experience before going straight from University to teacher training 
college. I was working in a bar when I saw a job advertised for a temporary 
residential social worker in what was then called a List D School. I had no idea what 
social work might be and little idea of what a List D School was, equating it, 
erroneously I came to realise, with Borstals or young offenders’ institutions. In fact, 
while most of the boys who attended had offended, List D Schools were, first and 
foremost, schools. Their task, of course, went wider than teaching to embrace what 
Kilbrandon (1964) termed ‘education in its widest sense, social education’.  
 
The school advertising the job was run by a religious order, the De La Salle Brothers. 
I had been brought up and remain a Catholic so felt comfortable with that. Around 
that time I was also becoming aware of Catholic Social Teaching (CST) and with 
liberation theology, within which solidarity with the poor is a central tenet. I applied 
for the job and was, initially, offered a one-year appointment. I was kept on and went 
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on to spend nine years there. This period was foundational in forming my ideas about 
child care and education. These have developed rather than changed over my years in 
practice and subsequently academia. As I have written in the book, “There was little 
sense of hierarchy or positional authority but the Brothers inspired an intense loyalty 
and followership. Their leadership was rooted in values of human dignity and 
respect, of discipline but also of forgiveness” (RRCC: x) 
 
I moved on in 1990 to become assistant head in another residential school (by this 
time no longer called List D as a result of withdrawal of Scottish Office funding). 
This was a different experience. Whereas the Brothers’ approach to boys and staff at 
St Joseph’s had been essentially pastoral, the school I moved to was, on the surface, 
more professional. Again, I have noted, “I was initially impressed by the sense of 
order that seemed to prevail. However, I soon became aware that attempts to ensure 
control through systems and procedures were not as effective as I first thought … 
procedures could be used by some staff as a substitute for building close and 
authoritative personal relationships with boys” … “Establishments”, I conclude 
“might have ‘i’s dotted and ‘t’s crossed but they also needed ‘soul’” (RRCC: x). 
Much of this account seeks to develop what I might mean by this. 
 
After a couple of years there, I was asked to take over as head of secure 
accommodation in Lothian Region. I then had a short interlude as manager of a small 
children’s home, what was called a Close support unit. This was an interesting period 
inasmuch as it reflected some of the ideas that were prevalent at that time (the early 
1990s). Close support units were intended to either prevent children going into 
secure accommodation or to provide a bridge back from secure accommodation into 
the community. The belief was that children would be subject to short-term, targeted 
‘interventions’ then moved back home or into community resources, ‘fixed’. Of 
course, it did not work out that way. The unit was actually successful in working 
with children but only because we kept them long term, thus subverting the original 
rationale for such units. After two years there I returned to manage a newly built 
secure unit and remained there, latterly as Principal for secure accommodation, for 
the remainder of my time in practice.  
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The early years of my time as head of the secure unit were among the most 
rewarding of my professional life. I had set up a unit from scratch with a new staff 
group, many of whom had never worked in residential child care before. With a 
small cohort of experienced and committed managers, we set about establishing a 
culture that was generally progressive and built around good relationships between 
children and staff – ‘a community that cared’ was how one of the senior staff 
remembered it when she came to move on. 
 
Then, in 1996, allegations of historical abuse across a number of children’s homes in 
Edinburgh began to surface, leading to the eventual conviction of two men. 
Following their conviction, the Council set up an inquiry. A sense of anxiety began 
to permeate the wider organisational culture, experienced on the ground in excessive 
scrutiny and suspicion. Many everyday practices that had been taken for granted, 
such as staff coming in on their own time to take children out on activities, became 
subject to suspicion. Staff, in turn, lost spontaneity and began to doubt themselves 
and one another. Children, inevitably, picked up on some of this anxiety.  
 
The subject of child abuse is one that is ripe for managerial responses – who could 
argue with robust management action to root out and prevent recurrence? Such 
action became evident in a proliferation of procedures, all of which shifted the locus 
of control and decision making away from the sites of direct practice towards 
external managers, most of whom had no experience of residential child care. A 
more sceptical interpretation might be that the ‘discovery’ of abuse was used as a 
catalyst to legitimate a very different way of political engagement with the care 
sector through what might be understood now as the New Public Management 
(Pollitt, 2003). The rationale for these changes was posited to be ‘safety’, although it 
was difficult even then to determine how much of this concern was based on 
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My central question 
In 2000, I left practice to develop a new Masters in Advanced Residential Child Care 
at the University of Strathclyde. I had not lost my love of direct practice and 
management but I had become disillusioned by what I can now understand and name 
as managerialism. Ideas of vocation and of close personal relationships became 
‘subsumed beneath a range of short-term technical rational interventions’ (RRCC: 
xi). This shift was represented in what Loughlin (2002) identifies as the buzzwords 
of improvement, modernisation and progress. I go on to express a persistent unease 
that this was not the true picture and that residential child care had, in fact, lost much 
along the way in its road towards modernisation. 
 
This dissonance between what I had experienced as a practitioner, which was largely 
positive, and what was promulgated as the brave new world of residential child care, 
which from my experience was not, is perhaps the central question that has exercised 
my thinking over the years since leaving practice and developing my academic 
thinking around residential child care. Much of this dissonance is existential. Within 
a framework of reflexivity it seems legitimate to say a bit about how such existential 
essences might be brought to play in my retrospective gaze over my past life in 
residential child care.  
 
The ‘selves’ I bring to the research process 
Some of the selves I bring to my academic engagement with residential child care are 
those alluded to above. I am a Catholic, sharing, I think, with Freire (1970) an 
ontological vocation that comes with this to act upon and seek to transform the world 
towards a greater humanisation. In this sense, my Catholicism and socialism come 
together almost seamlessly.  
 
Mollenhauer (1983), to whom I return, claims that adults’ understandings of 
upbringing are gleaned from their own experiences of being brought up. This, I 
think, is a crucial point though, in a world where we are encouraged to picture some 
idealised and abstract version of upbringing, one that is rarely acknowledged. In that 
respect, I am my parents’ son and this raises questions for me around how best to 
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address issues of poverty and disadvantage. In a similar vein, as a father, I can’t help 
but reflect on the disparities between how I bring up my own children and how I 
might be expected to bring up children in care. I know, obviously, that children in 
care come with a history but I am not sure that treating them as being invariably 
traumatised and requiring ‘therapy’ whatever that may be (I never quite worked this 
out in all my years of practice) is necessarily helpful. As a result, I strongly incline 
towards broadly educational means of helping people change and move on in their 
lives. The efficacy of a social education orientation seem to be given some substance 
in Gharabaghi’s (2012) work in which he points to the shortcomings of treatment 
models for children in care and the need for a greater focus on education through 
living and learning.  
 
The final existential self I should declare is as a Scot. Increasingly, I am coming to 
realise that the cultural and intellectual heritage that this brings with it plays an 
important part in how I understand the world. Some of this will be touched upon as 
the review proceeds. 
 
A number of ‘professional ‘selves’ also find their way into my writing. I mention 
only one. Doucet, (2008) writes of the ghosts that haunt a researcher’s 
understanding. The ghost that haunts mine is that of Brother Ben, who, at 70 years of 
age, I saw jailed for ‘electrocuting’ children. This experience has had a major 
bearing on how I engage with the subject of historical abuse. I am aware that my 
starting position is to question allegations of abuse and in so doing I may be seen to 
dismiss accounts that are genuine. On the other hand, because I am swimming 
against the tide on this issue, I need to make sure that I can show my workings on it 
and that my arguments are robust. Interestingly, no-one has challenged my position 
in an academic journal and others who do write on the subject are beginning to 
reference my work to bring an alternative reading or at least some nuance to the 
debate. 
  
These ‘selves’ provide, in Gadamer’s terms, the pre-understandings that I bring to 
my deliberations on residential care. They meld with increasingly broad academic 
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knowledge to build up a rich picture of the field. Conversely, little of the literature I 
read in my early years as an academic felt particularly useful in explaining the world 
of practice that I knew. At another level, these various ‘selves’ come together to 
inform what Willis (2011) calls a story to live by, which permeates my engagement 
with residential child care. 
 
A couple of years into academic life I came across Moss and Petrie’s (2002) book, 
From Children’s Services to Children’s Spaces, which proved to be an epiphanic 
moment. Here was care described as moral, political and practical rather than 
technical/rational and instrumental. The book also led me in the direction of authors I 
had not previously heard of, specifically, Zygmunt Bauman and Joan Tronto, whose 
ideas I develop in the two articles in this submission. Moss and Petrie pose a number 
of questions, which frame how we might begin to think about notions of care and 
upbringing. They ask: 1) "what do we want for our children?" 2) "What is a good 
childhood? and 3) what kind of relationships do we wish to promote between 
children and adults?" (2002: 4). Questions as to what is a good childhood resonate 
with wider ideas of what is a good or flourishing life. This wider Aristotelian notion 
of flourishing, developed by Jean Vanier (2001) in the context of his work with 
adults with learning disabilities, has been influential in some of my thinking as to 
how children are brought up. We ought, as a society, be concerned about how 
children might flourish, not merely whether they are protected or are claiming their 
rights. 
 
So, to draw this section to a close, my motivation for writing the book and indeed 
much of my other writing, was, largely, to help me make sense of my own 
experience and, through this, to hope that my account might strike a chord with 
others in the field and beyond. At one level it is cathartic, it involves, in a phrase 
borrowed from Moss and Petrie (2002), putting a stutter into dominant narratives 
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Chapter Two: A history of the present 
 
In this chapter I attempt what Parton, following Foucault, calls a history of present, 
to outline how care “has been constituted and to make explicit the range of 
complexities, ambiguities and tensions that have fed into it” (2006: 3). 
 
For much of the 20th Century residential care provision was, primarily, in the hands 
of the churches or charities. With a focus on basic physical care and moral probity 
and with little awareness of children’s emotional needs, assumptions and practices in 
such homes might seem anachronistic viewed through a modern day lens. Webb 
(2010) nonetheless, identifies a sense of moral purpose and vocation among those 
who ran them. Following World War Two, the 1948 Children Act established local 
authority Children’s Departments, with responsibility for child care, including 
residential child care. The 1948 Act led to the growth from the 1950s of family group 
homes, in which live-in ‘aunties’ and ‘uncles’ brought up groups of children 
alongside their own families. A similar model emerged in residential schools where 
housemasters and housemothers were responsible for and lived attached to cottage 
units in which children lived. Reflecting wider societal attitudes at that time, gender 
roles remained well defined, with the ‘auntie’ or housemother taking responsibility 
for domestic and nurturing tasks and the uncle or housemaster expected to assume a 
disciplinary role. Similarly, mirroring wider societal ideas of the family, child care 
provision operated largely within the private domain, with those providing care left 
much to their own devices as to what this care might be like. While this was a 
problem at one level, as subsequent revelations of abuse attest, it was also vitally 
important, as care needs some boundaries put around it; the panoptical gaze of 
regulation might be as much a problem as no scrutiny at all (Reeves, 2012). It 
prevents adults from taking responsibility for children’s upbringing. 
 
The professionalisation of social work following legislation in the late 1960s saw 
residential child care located within the new generic profession. The nature of care 
changed from what had been a largely domestic task to become a more ostensibly 
professional one. ‘Professionalisation’ saw a shift away from the live-in staff who 
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had been at the heart of previous models of care to what Douglas and Payne (1981) 
called an ‘industrial model’ in which the personal and professional selves of carers 
became separated as a result of the introduction of shift systems, but also by ideas 
that made particular assumptions of what it was to be ‘professional’. The model of 
the bureau professional within large local authority bureaucracies was premised on 
qualities of ‘objectivity’ and ‘professional distance’ (Meagher and Parton, 2004).  
In its quest for professional status, residential child care looked to psychology to 
provide the kind of ‘scientific’ provenance that was lacking in mere care. It thus 
flirted with psychodynamic ideas, behaviourism, social learning theory and more 
recently, attachment theory (see RRCC Chapter Five). Of course, none of these 
provided the philosopher’s stone leading to ‘what works’ (Allan, 2011). 
 
Social work, as it developed from the 1960s, drew on two dominant strands of 
thinking. The first of these was a clinical orientation deriving from the medical roots 
that formed one thread in the profession’s history, focused on individual and family 
problems. The second strand was an increasingly structural one, drawing on a 
literature hostile to institutional care. Goffman’s (1961) Asylums is perhaps the 
foremost example of this. Both these strands of thinking – the individual clinical and 
the anti-institutional – highlight some ambivalence and tensions in conceptualising 
residential child care within social work (Smith et al, 2013). 
 
Ambivalence towards residential child care was reflected in a strong preference for 
fostering as the placement of choice for children who could not be cared for at home. 
The Children who wait report (Rowe and Lambert, 1973), commissioned by the 
Association of British Adoption Agencies and influenced by the growing literature 
around attachment (Bowlby, 1951) claimed that all children need to be brought up in 
a family environment. It identified thousands of children in residential care settings 
who did not need to be there and an absence of planning for their futures.  
 
Children who wait was used to support an ideological case that residential child care 
could not provide sufficiently strong attachment opportunities or the experience of 
permanence for children. Alternative family care as the preferred choice for children 
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became deeply embedded in social work thinking. Changing Lives, the report of the 
21st Century Social Work Review in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2006), reflects a 
wider social work orthodoxy when it notes, without further explanation or evidence, 
that: ‘While residential child care remains the option of choice for a few children, 
many more are accommodated in residential provision due to a shortage of foster 
placements’ (2006: 23). Foster care was also considered to be a cheaper option. 
 
Despite such strong professional preference for foster care, there is growing evidence 
that, as it has been used within local authority social work as a short-term measure, it 
does not provide stability for many of the children placed there. Indeed, in many 
cases it can build instability, as children are moved serially between foster 
placements (Smith et al, 2013). 
 
The 1995 Children (Scotland) Act reinforced shifting conceptions of care, reflecting 
a move towards more legalistic and contractual approaches to service provision. It 
replaced the term ‘care’ with ‘looked after’.  Children and young people in 
residential care were described as being ‘looked after and accommodated’, 
suggesting an instrumental and short-term conception of care, a hoteling function, 
rather than the open-ended, if arguably unfocussed, commitment that had gone 
before.   
 
A combination of ideology and cost contributed substantially to the decline in the 
usage of residential child care from a high point in the mid 1970s (Bebbington and 
Miles, 1981). In England, for instance, “placements in community homes fell from 
over 25,000 to less than 2000 between 1981 and 2000” (Kendrick, 2012: 288). A 
growing preference for foster care entailed that younger children were most often 
placed there, with the result that residential care became, predominantly, a service 
for the most troubled, challenging and hard to place adolescents (Courtney and 
Iwaniec, 2009), with inevitable implications for group dynamics and behaviour 
management.  
 
The recent history of residential child care has been a chequered one, characterised 
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by continuing ideological aversion to its use, assumptions of poor outcomes and the 
child abuse scandals, which first came to light over the course of the 1990s. Evidence 
to support such negative views is, in fact, somewhat more nuanced than can be 
presented. While it is hard to argue that outcomes from residential child care are as 
good as they might be, this debate needs to be understood against the backdrop of the 
residualisation of this form of provision, rendering comparison with the wider 
population of children problematic. Forrester (2008) shows that being admitted into 
care (both foster and residential) in fact, almost always leads to some improvement 
in children’s personal and social situations. Evidence can be similarly contested 
regarding the scale of abuse in residential care as I suggest in the book and in 
subsequent writing (Smith (2010; Smith et al, 2012). The result of inadequately 
thought through beliefs of poor outcomes and of abuse is to reinforce a particularly 
negative perception of residential child care which, in turn, legitimises a tendency to 
further restrict its usage. As Webb observes: “in the face of the impracticality of its 
total abandonment, (organizational responses have) consigned those in what is 
sometimes now called ‘corporate care’ to an even more stigmatising experience  
(Webb, 2009: 1394). 
 
Care in the neoliberal world 
 
In many respects this dynamic of unanticipated consequences resulting from policy 
decisions might be thought of as falling within the ‘cock-up’ theory of history or 
social policy. At another level, however, there may be a more deliberate aspect to 
policy developments around residential child care. For such an argument to be 
advanced requires a structural analysis, which locates the sector within the context of 
the neoliberal project. I begin to locate residential child care within such a wider 
context in the book (RRCC: Chapter One) where, drawing on Harvey (2005), I set 
out some of the core tenets of neoliberalism and its handmaiden, managerialism. 
 
Neoliberalism, which might most readily be identified in the UK with the election of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979, is described by Harvey as a “theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
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individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong property rights, free markets and free trade” (2005: 2). 
 
The imprint of neoliberalism on practice is evident in the doctrine of managerialism 
(Clark and Newman, 1997). This was based around core principles of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness and a belief that these aims could be achieved by more 
and better management (Pollitt, 1993). This created the conditions through which 
“private sector disciplines can be introduced to the public services, political control 
can be strengthened, budgets trimmed, professional autonomy reduced, public 
service unions weakened and a quasi-competitive framework erected to flush out the 
natural inefficiencies of bureaucracy” (Pollitt, 1990: 49). Managerialism became 
manifest in ideas of care management, whereby care could be broken down into 
clean-cut stages of assessment and programmed interventions that would lead to 
measurable and improved outcomes over specified (preferably short) periods of time 
(Rose, 2010).  
 
The neoliberal reform of care started with older people’s services (Scourfield, 2007). 
It has spread rapidly, however, to the extent that 76% of children’s homes in England 
are now owned by the independent sector, with only 24% owned by local authorities 
(AAPG, 2012). A central consequence of this situation is that residential care is now 
“a commodity . . . there to be traded and exploited for its surplus value like any other 
commodity” (Scourfield, 2007: 162) and as a consequence “the quest for profitability 
means that business values, reductions in costs and income generation have been 
prioritised over and above the quality of care” (Scourfield, 2007: 170).  
 
In addition to eroding qualities of care and relationships, neoliberalism also seeks “to 
remake work and to alter the aims, aspirations and affiliations of a range of 
professional groups and fields” (Garrett, 2010). It has injected new forms of 
insecurity into people’s working lives. This is frequently discussed in terms of the 
notion of ‘precariousness’, or ‘precaricity’, reflected in, for example, the growth of 
short-term contracts and the growth of ‘agency’ working where wages are pared to a 
minimum and staff have few employment rights (Garrett, 2010). In the case of 
	   31	  
residential child care, this had previously argued to be social work and as such 
requiring to be staffed by a professionally qualified workforce. This aspiration has 
been incrementally reduced. Residential work is now ‘social care’, a primarily 
vocational rather than professional task. The lower level of qualifications required to 
do care jobs is offset by ‘policing’ the workforce through ever-expanding 
inspectorial and audit functions (Humphrey, 2003). 
 
Against this backdrop the negative publicity focused on residential child care might 
be re-framed and understood within a foundational aim of the neoliberal project to 
maintain a state of perpetual crisis. Garrett (2006) suggests that the whole notion that 
the 'care system' is 'failing' can be understood as an intensely ideological project, 
required within the neoliberal frame of reference to reveal failure in order to provide 
a rationale for privatisation (Garrett, 2006). 
 
At another level, neoliberal ideology is predicated upon a particular understanding of 
the person as independent, autonomous and competitive. There is, Thatcher claimed, 
no such thing as society, no collective, only individuals and families looking out for 
themselves. Neoliberalism constructs care (with its connotations of weakness and 
dependency) as something to be avoided (Steckley and Smith, 2011).  
 
The task of residential child care shifted: 
 
away from responding to the needs of the ‘concrete other’ to echo broader, 
universalising discursive and social policy agendas. Specifically, it is subject to 
the dominant concerns that have come to frame approaches to children in 
neoliberal, anglophone societies, specifically those of risk, rights, and protection. 
(Steckley and Smith: 183/4) 
 
In this account I focus on the place of protection and rights within a neoliberal 
paradigm. The dominant view of human beings in neoliberalism is, in many respects, 
a Hobbesian one, presupposing the worst in people and advocating strong 
government action to keep them in check. If one perceives individuals as being 
motivated only by their own selfish interests then they need external authority and 
frameworks to protect them from worst excesses of equally grasping others. 
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Children, who have a special status, almost a redemptive status, having not yet 
reached this dystopian end-state, need to be protected, especially from adults who 
have no sense of a common good. Protection, in this sense, betrays an essentially 
misanthropic take on human relationships, involving: “a very different conception of 
the relationship between an individual or group, and others than does care. Caring 
seems to involve taking the concerns and needs of the other as the basis for action. 
Protection presumes … bad intentions” (Tronto, 1993: 104).  
 
Similarly, children’s rights, as they have emerged in public policy, are premised on 
“a particular understanding of the subject as a rational, autonomous individual” 
(Dahlberg and Moss, 2005: 30). By this way of thinking children and adults become 
linked to one another, primarily, through a series of contractual arrangements, 
evident in residential care in developments such as the proliferation of information 
booklets and complaints procedures.   
 
Harvey (2005) notes, however, that despite its monolithic aspirations neoliberalism is 
in fact shot through with contradictions. In practice, this has led, not to less and 
leaner government as the doctrine might profess, but to more intrusive and narrowly 
bureaucratic government, a trend particularly evident following the election of the 
New Labour Government in 1997. 
 
Care in the Third Way 
 
The New Labour Government adopted what it called a Third Way to policy 
formulation.  This was claimed to be an ostensibly ‘modern’ and efficient approach 
to government in which ‘what matters was what worked’. Aside from pursuing 
efficiency, modernization 
  
offers a particular conception of the citizen (empowered as active, participating 
subjects), of work (as the source of opportunity for the ‘‘socially excluded’’), of 
community (non-antagonistic and homogeneous), and of nation (setting out 
Britain’s place in the changing global economy) (Newman, 2000: 47).  
 
The ‘Third Way’, however, is a neoliberal way, perhaps more accurately a specific 
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and national articulation of neoliberalism (Hall, 2003). Third Way politics placed 
great faith in regulation. Specifically, New Labour oversaw the introduction of 
legislation to regulate care introduced across all parts of the UK in 2001. This set 
standards against which care homes might be inspected and also introduced 
regulation of the workforce, arguably to improve services and safeguard the public. 
This was also the era of the ‘corporate parent’, terminology which, intentionally or 
otherwise, had the effect of locating responsibility for the care of children, with 
conglomerates of local authority departments and their inspectorial overseers, rather 
than with those individuals engaging with them on a day-to-day basis. 
 
McLaughlin (2010) argues that there is little evidence that regulation has improved 
quality in care services. What these developments, and the way they have been 
interpreted and enacted, have done is to create an “enormous proliferation of 
legislation, regulation and guidance … as if by classifying, codifying, monitoring, 
incentivising and target setting in almost every conceivable sphere of social 
interaction, government could achieve the complete set of beneficial and positive 
outcomes’ (Jordan, 2010: 3). The problem, however, according to Jordan (2010) is 
that New Labour introduced the wrong type of regulation, contractual regulation 
rather than moral regulation. The failure of the Third way, he claims, was ultimately 
a moral failure. Politicians believed society could be improved by proliferation of 
contractual regulation rather than deeper consideration of values. 
 
The corruption of care 
 
In an important article, Wardaugh and Wilding (1993) reflect on the ‘Pindown’ 
regime in Staffordshire children’s homes where children were subject to an extreme 
form of behaviour management. They formulate a number of propositions which, 
they argue, contribute to the corruption of care.  It is an article that is often quoted in 
writing about abuse in care. Its basic premise, however, is largely misunderstood and 
many of the features the authors identify as being implicated in the corruption of care 
have not only been left unaddressed but have, in many cases, been compounded by 
managerial responses. In focussing narrowly on avoiding internal management 
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failures, such responses have actually reinforced other organisational features 
implicated in the corruption of care, specifically those pertaining to the impact of 
bureaucratic structures on care practices and the consequences of feelings of 
powerlessness experienced by those who provide direct care. The authors, in fact, 
draw on Bauman’s work to explicate ideas of social distance and of othering, both of 
which are likely results of impersonal and instrumental management regimes. 
 
Corruption, according to Wardaugh and Wilding (1993) can be of various kinds. The 
essential element, however, is that it constitutes an active betrayal of the basic values 
on which the organisation is supposedly based. The fundamental corruption in the 
care system over recent decades has been a failure to care. The concept of care was, 
in the first instance, marginalised in the professionalisation and bureaucratisation of 
social work. Subsequently, it was re-shaped by neoliberal political and economic 
policies which, in their concern for the bottom line and for managerial diktat, are 
incongruent with the provision of nurturing and relational care. 
 
The impact of these various discursive trends brought to bear on residential child 
care have contributed to a situation whereby: 
 
the concept of care within public care for children has been rarely seen as 
visible….a narrowing of what we mean by care, a lowering of expectations of 
what the state can offer in terms of care. Of particular note is the marked contrast 
between the potential for care within families as centring on control and love, and 
the optimum expected from state care which is around safekeeping. Care as used 
in legislation seems to have been emptied of its potential, a dried up expression 
for how to manage an underclass of disadvantage (Cameron, 2003: 91-92). 
 
A large part of the problem that confronts care is actually a failure to imbue it with a 
sense of purpose and to allow adults to feel that they can take responsibility for 
children’s upbringing. Comparing this current state with the sense of moral purpose 
apparent in earlier manifestations of residential child care, Webb characterises the 
situation thus: 
Apparently ‘progressive’, and terrified of censoriousness or of being oppressive, 
the consequences for practice are permissiveness and laissez-fairism. Under these 
conditions the psychological and cultural powerlessness of young residents leads 
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to the appropriation of their identity as they become swept along by the trivial and 
everyday. This is where leniency leads us, despite being superficially attractive, 
‘progressive’ and ‘democratic’. Far from allowing an identity that is liberated 
from convention, the child in care becomes subject to the pervasiveness not so 
much of dominant culture but the mundane everyday culture and its insinuations 
for young people about their beliefs, being and identity … (2009: 1395/6) 
 
What is missing, I would argue, from present day state care is any appropriate 
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Chapter Three: Care and upbringing 
 
This chapter moves towards a conceptualisation of ideas of care and upbringing and 
to place these at the centre of what state care might offer children. 
 
An ethic of care 
 
Some of the most important work around the nature of care is contained in the 
expanding literature around an ethic of care, associated, initially, with Carol 
Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice (1982). Gilligan was a student of Lawrence 
Kohlberg, who expounded what has become the standard model of human moral 
development. She challenged Kohlberg’s model as reflecting predominantly male 
ways of thinking and acting on questions of morality. Men are deemed to speak and 
act from a ‘justice’ orientation, where qualities of objectivity, rationality and general 
principle predominate, women from a ‘care’ orientation drawing on ‘softer’ 
attributes of intuition, connection and compassion in reaching moral decisions. Care 
ethics have moved on since Gilligan to encompass a growing body of work on moral 
theory across a range of disciplines.   
 
In recent years care ethics have been the subject of two special editions of the journal 
Ethics and Social Welfare and a book drawing these together (Koggel and Orme, 
2013). In the article with Steckley (2011), published in the journal and the book, I 
develop the literature on care ethics within the particular context of residential child 
care. The following sections provide a backdrop to the article. 
 
Following from Gilligan’s seminal work, Tronto (1993) conceptualised care as a 
practice describing it as a “specious activity that includes everything that we do to 
maintain, continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible” 
(1993: 103). A moral person attains that status in the ways in which they respond to 
the injunctions to care that present themselves in everyday life. Tronto goes on to say 
that “an ethic of care is a practice, rather than a set of rules or principles… It 
involves both particular acts of caring and a ‘general habit of mind’ to care that 
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should inform all aspects of a practitioner’s moral life” (1993: 126/7). 
Sevenhuijsen's (1998) work locates care within concepts 
of responsibilities and relationships rather than rules and rights. 
 
Elements of an ethic of care 
Tronto (1993) identifies four elements to an ethic of care. Carers need to demonstrate 
attentiveness - they need to be available to the other, to convey the sense that they 
and perhaps only they matter at that particular moment. Caring also demands that 
carers take responsibility for caring. How they do so derives from implicit cultural 
practice rather than formal rules. Good intentions are not sufficient in the care of 
others. Tronto’s third element of care requires competence. The final of Tronto’s 
elements of an ethic of care is responsiveness. Carers are to be aware of the 
vulnerability of others, and respond to their needs in a way that they would want. 
Importantly, Fisher and Tronto (1990) identify a fifth element of care, incorporated 
into Tronto’s subsequent work and that is care receiving. This identifies care, not as 
something that is one-directional, done unto another out of duty, but as being 
fundamentally relational and reciprocal and within which the care receiver is an 
active partner in determining how care might be offered and experienced. The one-
caring and the cared for (Noddings, 2002) are thrown together in a care relationship 
in which power dynamics are complex and non-linear, emotional rather than 
instrumental.  
 
Caring for and caring about 
One of the most accessible expositions of care ethics and, given her roots in school 
teaching one of particular relevance to residential care, is provided in the work of 
Nel Noddings (1984, 2002). Noddings (1984) distinguishes between ‘caring for’ and 
‘caring about.’ ‘Caring for’ is what residential care workers do. They work at the 
level of the face to face encounter with children engaging in physical aspects of care 
such as personal hygiene and in issues of care and control; they soak up the intensity 
of children’s emotions and get involved in the messy bits around intimacy and 
boundaries. There is an inevitable rawness and unpredictability about ‘caring for’.  
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‘Caring about’ puts more distance between carers and the objects of their care. It is 
what people might do when they take a stance on an issue or give to charity; they do 
not provide care directly but have a general predisposition to see that children are 
cared for. ‘Caring for’ and ‘caring about’ are linked, however; the capacity to care 
about derives from our experience of being cared for (Noddings, 2002). In this sense, 
caring about is implicated in a wider desire for social justice. It does not and should 
not, however, get us off the hook of ‘caring for’, or responding to the needs of the 
concrete other. Noddings’ distinction between ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’ may 
help cast some light on the difference between residential workers and social 
workers. Social workers tend to take a more distant, ‘objective’ bigger picture view 
of situations; residential workers derive their knowledge from the intimacy of their 
everyday ‘caring for’ encounters.  
 
Koggel and Orme (2010), to some extent, sum up the current state of play as regards 
care ethics in the following statement: 
 
Gilligan’s uncovering of a ‘different voice’ has had broad implications in its 
challenge to mainstream moral theory in the liberal tradition. In contrast to 
accounts of universal principles and of the significance of impartiality, individual 
rights, consequences, and justice in consequentialist and deontological moral 
theories, the ethic of care emphasizes the importance of context, interdependence, 
relationships, and responsibilities to concrete others (2010: 109). 
 
Caring institutions 
In a contribution to the special volume of Ethics and Social Welfare, Tronto (2010) 
addresses the question of what might make for a caring institution. The premise of 
Noddings’ (2002) book, Starting at Home is that the best way to think about care 
institutions is to model them upon the family. Tronto (2010) argues, however, that 
while we can turn to family life to intuit some elements of good care, to provide such 
care in an institutional context requires that certain elements of care that go unspoken 
and are taken for granted in the family setting are made explicit. Care institutions, 
she argues, need to have an identifiable sense of purpose. Increasingly, I am moving 
towards an idea of upbringing as the overarching purpose of children’s care. 
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Upbringing 
 
I now turn to the writing of the German social pedagogue Klaus Mollenhauer (1928-
1998) to begin to articulate a concept of upbringing. I was introduced to 
Mollenhauer’s work through my involvement in the Centre for Understanding Social 
Pedagogy (CUSP). Interest in social pedagogy reflects the direction that much of my 
work is taking (see RRCC, Chapter Ten) and Mollenhauer’s explication of 
upbringing is central to this. 
 
Bringing up children is identified by Mollenhauer as a moral and cultural endeavour, 
brought about through caring, inter-generational relationships. His book, Forgotten 
Connections: On Culture and Upbringing (1983), is regarded as one of the most 
important German contributions to educational theory and scholarship in the 20th 
century. It has been translated into several languages, but has not yet appeared in 
English. For this summary I am dependent on translated excerpts and articles in 
English by two scholars, Norm Friesen and Tone Saevi. 
 
What is upbringing? 
Paul Natorp (1904), an early social pedagogic writer, identifies the essence of the 
discipline as being the upbringing of an individual and their integration into society. 
Man (sic), according to Natorp, can only become man through human interaction; 
individuals can only develop fully as part of society. Children, thus, need to be 
brought up as social beings.  
 
Central aspects of upbringing are reflected in the German terms erziehung and 
bildung. Erziehung can be translated, loosely, as ‘education’ or ‘upbringing’, 
blurring the boundary between school and home, personal and professional. Bildung 
is often claimed not to have an equivalent term in English to convey its scope. It is in 
essence about moral and social cultivation or formation (Lovlie et al, 2003). It is 
what Mollenhauer characterised as the ‘way of the self’, describing how we form 
ourselves and are formed by others, eventually to become mature individuals within 
a never ending process of maturation. The context of bildung spans both formal and 
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informal contexts and roles, familial, scholastic or recreational. In this sense, appeals 
solely to the power of the family or the school in upbringing and education are, 
according to Mollenhauer, inadequate; the task transcends these boundaries. It 
involves the cultivation of the inner life or soul of the child and their inauguration to 
culture, tradition, and humanity (Friesen and Saevi, 2010). Upbringing in this context 
is not so much something that is learnt in institutions such as schools or children’s 
homes (although both undoubtedly play a role in it) or through methods and 
techniques such as the latest social skills programme. Rather, it happens all around 
us, “so general as to be inseparable from basic human realities like language, work 
and - in the broadest sense - human culture” (Mollenhauer, 1983: 1).  
 
Upbringing is first and foremost a matter of preparing children to face the future, a 
debt owed by the adult generation to children. As I indicated earlier, adult 
understandings of upbringing are, by their nature, backward looking; we construct a 
sense of what might constitute a good upbringing against a backdrop of our own 
experiences of being brought up. There is not necessarily an unambiguously good 
upbringing - for most their upbringing involved both good and less good aspects. 
Mollenhauer draws on autobiographies written over the centuries to bear testimony 
to the fact that, apart from being grateful to our parents for the upbringing they gave 
us, we also have reason to find fault with it. Each individual’s education and 
upbringing is at once a process of broadening and enrichment as well as a narrowing 
and impoverishment. Adults are more than mere midwives to the development of a 
child’s mind and spirit: they also, for whatever reason, through limiting or closing 
down opportunities, act to censor the adult the child ultimately becomes 
(Mollenhauer, 1983). 
 
Mollenhauer challenges seemingly progressive or rights based educational 
philosophies, which might posit that children need to find their own paths in life. 
Such philosophies, he argues, seek to absolve us from our adult responsibilities to 
pass on our cultural heritage. They also ignore the fact that adult involvement with 
children is not neutral. As Winkler puts it, “we cannot not engage in upbringing” 
(2002, cited in Friesen and Hamelock, 2012: 12). “It is simply unimaginable”, 
	   41	  
according to Mollenhauer, “for an adult to undertake any educational or child-rearing 
measure without conveying some aspect of him or herself or the way he or she lives, 
whether it is deliberate or not” (1983: 14). Thus, in failing to present children with a 
confident, if albeit contingent, image of what we consider to be the ‘good life’ we 
risk presenting them only with a free-floating nihilism. This would seem to constitute 
the essence of Webb’s (2010) critique of residential care addressed earlier. Adults, 
therefore have to consider the question of what they want for children and 
specifically whether the lives they lead are ones that contribute positively to 
children’s upbringing. 
 
What do we want for children? 
A	   good	   starting	   point	   in	   coming	   to	   terms	   with	   Mollenhauer’s	   conception	   of	  
upbringing	   is	   the	   German	   notion	   of	   Bildsamkeit,	   which	   determines	   that	  
development	  cannot	  be	  externally	   forced	  but	   that	   the	  child	   is	  oriented	  toward	  
development	  and	  asks	  for	  the	  help	  on	  that	  journey;	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  child	  to	  
want	  to	  grow	  and	  it	  is	  the	  adult’s	  task	  to	  recognize	  and	  respond	  to	  this	  call	  and	  
to	  guide	  and	  nurture	   this	  growth.	  Children	  are	  not	  blank	  slates	   to	  be	  changed	  
and	  formed.	  Instead	  they	  should	  be	  brought	  up	  in	  support	  of	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  
potentiality.	   This	   does	   not	   happen	   through	   method	   or	   technique	   but	   in	  
reciprocal	   and	   dialogical	   relationship	  with	   adults.	   The	   relationship	   between	   a	  
child	  and	  adult	  might	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  call	  and	  response	  –	  the	  child	  calls	  
and	   the	   adult	   responds.	   As	   an	   adult	   I	   might	   respond	   to	   a	   child’s	   need	   for	  
upbringing	  because:	  
 
I want the (perhaps very little) goodness in my life to be perpetuated. This 
response has at least three implications: 
1. I would like human history to continue with a sense of optimism or at least of 
hope that also orients my own actions;  
2. My own existence can be perpetuated in some small, indirect way through my 
children; 
3. The way of life I teach children has some value. (1983: 12) 
 
Mollenhauer’s development of these propositions is important and I reproduce it 
below: 
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If these responses, cursory though they may be, make at least some sense, then the 
next question has to concern what adults bring to children. I refer to this as 
‘cultural heritage,’ and the fitness of this heritage for the future. Anyone who does 
not have a heritage of some kind to pass on will probably take little pleasure in 
raising or educating children. … When the desire to see generations born beyond 
one’s own is extinguished, educational and even experiential possibilities are 
greatly diminished. Conservative excesses threaten to turn upbringing into a 
ritualized duty. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that adults lose the 
desire to raise children and only want to interact with them as mirror images of 
their adult selves (1983: 12). 
 
In the following section I bring together Mollenhauer’s ideas on how a valued 
cultural heritage or a way of life might be passed on to children, addressing his 
explication of the shift from presenting a way of life to children to that of ‘re-
presenting’ it. 
 
Presentation and Representation  
Mollenhauer argues that adults and children in pre-modern societies lived their lives 
in largely undifferentiated ways; adults simply ‘presented’ to children their grown-up 
‘way of life’ (lebensform) in the course of what might nowadays be thought of as a 
sharing a common life-space. The manner through which they passed on this way of 
life was unsystematic and unreflective: 
 
The essential structures of adult behaviour are there for children to see, and, as 
they grow, children are able to learn about a very wide range of grown-up 
behaviours simply by living with them. It is the child’s principal educational task 
to reproduce this image. This manner of upbringing is implicit and habitual … 
(Friesen and Saevi, 2010: 129).  
 
Representation 
Mollenhauer uses illustrations to show how, with the rise of merchant capitalism in 
the 16th Century and its concomitant growing division of labour, adults’ ‘work’ 
gradually became separated off from children’s ‘learning’. This required that, rather 
than simply ‘present’ adult ways of life to children, naturalistically, decisions began 
to be taken around which features of adult life ought to be presented or indeed 
interpreted as valuable and ‘re-presented’ and which features were to be filtered out. 
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This led to an increasing emphasis on instructional techniques and methods through 
which to most efficiently pass on that which was considered culturally valuable, 
which in turn led to the growth of specialised institutions - schools, orphanages and 
youth clubs within which the young might be taught. 
 
These specialised institutions served to filter out aspects of adult life and culture 
from young learners in what Mollenhauer refers to as ‘cultural 
compartmentalisation’. Formal education became separated off from wider processes 
of upbringing; adult culture was no longer presented to the child as a seamless 
whole, but only in part. “Whereas processes of presentation are implicit, habitual, 
and in this sense natural, those of representation are artificial, relying on forethought, 
planning, testing, refinement, and technical expertise” (Friesen and Saevi, 2010: 
132). This poses questions for teachers and carers as to what way of life ought to be 
systematically represented to children and more technical considerations of choosing 
how best this might be done within the range of available methods (Mollenhauer, 
1983).  
 
The other side of the coin of what is to be represented to children is that of what 
needs to be filtered out? Parents and carers need to strike the balance between 
ensuring an age-appropriate ‘shielding’ of children from some of the harmful aspects 
of the adult world and helping them reach a ‘position facing the world’ (Plessner, in 
Friesen and Saevi, 2010). This negotiation of a ‘position facing the world’ is an 
important one in that it involves a necessary delay or ‘slowing down’ of the impact 
of adult life upon children. The absence of such a ‘slowing down’ can give rise, from 
a pedagogical perspective, to problematic relations (Mollenhauer, 1983). Adults, 
therefore, have a role in pacing a child’s initiation into the adult world. For instance, 
while they may swear in the company of adult companions, they will not do so in 
front of children. Similarly, they may drink alcohol while in the company of 
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The interplay between presentation and representation 
A dialectic emerges between questions of presentation and representation. While the 
process of representation involves some systematic decisions around what to present 
to children, what to filter out and how to go about this, the mistake, Mollenhauer 
(1983) points out, is to assume that this kind of technical specialisation is what 
education is about.  In everyday pedagogical practice, systematic and deliberate 
representation is inextricably mixed with reflective and habitual presentation. In fact, 
messages that are transmitted by direct teaching are of more limited importance than 
those that unwittingly seep into a learner’s consciousness without either the teacher 
or pupil knowing anything about it. (Friesen and Saevi, 2010). In this process, a 
teacher’s or carer’s glance or countenance may be of more import than the latest 
curricular initiative or anger management programme. The pedagogical relation in 
this sense precedes educational methods and theories (Saevi, 2011); the task of 
upbringing is seen as “emerging from a sustained encounter between generations, 
specifically between a particular adult or teacher and a particular child or student as 
persons’’ (Friesen and Saevi, 2010: 142). Within such encounters “the child is 
always recognized as a unique, irreplaceable person, rather than being seen in terms 
of a developmental stage or category, or of a particular psychological diagnosis” 
(Friesen and Saevi, 2011: 139). Pedagogical practice, rather than looking to 
procedure or some elusive ‘best practice’ “speaks in anecdotes, stories, examples and 
questions that provide opportunity for experience rather than explanation, for 
listening rather than verification” (Saevi 2010: 2). 
 
Pedagogical relationships 
I allude to the centrality of relationships in the introduction to this review and it is a 
central theme of the book (RRCC, Chapter Eight). Care ethics also foreground 
relationships. Mollenhauer offers a suggestive account of the particular form of the 
pedagogical relationship, which, he claims, constitutes a special kind of personal 
relationship between adult and child. Nohl characterises this as “the loving 
relationship of a mature person with a ‘developing’ person, entered into for the sake 
of child so that he can discover his own life and form” (cited in Spiecker, 1984: 203-
204).  
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Mollenhauer’s understanding of the pedagogical relation is marked by a number of 
characteristics, which I summarise below: 
• There is a purpose, and a context to pedagogical relationships, such as 
upbringing, teaching, guiding or supervising.  
• It is grounded in the difference between the generations and the personal and 
cultural need for upbringing (Saevi, 2011). 
• The adult is directed toward the child and wants or intends what is good for the 
child's future. This relationship is oriented to what the child may become, but this 
is, by its nature, open-ended and cannot be determined by adult plans or goals; 
we cannot second-guess the outcomes of our attempts at upbringing. 
• The relationship is asymmetrical, unlike many other personal relationships (e.g. 
friendship). The adult is "there" for the child in a way that the child is not ‘there’ 
for the adult. The extent of any asymmetry might vary, depending on the purpose 
of the relation, the adult’s ability to care, the age of the child and their need for 
care. 
• The relationship is dispositional, reflecting personal, physical and emotional 
elements of who and how an adult is in relation to children.  
• In the pedagogical relation the adult is tactful, involving holding back and 
waiting or maintaining a certain distance so that the child may act for him- or 
herself. This quality might also be described as watchful and thoughtful, working 
out when to intervene and when to leave be. Inevitably this involves being 
prepared to take some risks. 
• The relationship may at times be conflictual and can require adults to assert a 
level of authority or control. Kleipoedszus (2011) argues that relationships can be 
forged through conflict. Children need adults who will not avoid conflict due to 
fear, but who will work creatively with it. The connection created through 
genuine engagement and negotiation rather than artificial sensitivity makes it 
possible in the longer term for child care workers to encourage and nurture 
change rather than demanding it.   
• Crucially, the pedagogical relationship comes to an end. The child grows up and 
the asymmetry of the relationship (if it is still maintained) dissolves. Indeed, the 
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pedagogical relationship works towards its own dissolution. Mollenhauer (1983) 
explains that upbringing comes to an end when the child no longer needs to be 
‘called’ to self-activity, but instead has the wherewithal to educate himself. The 
grown child may still maintain a relationship with an adult who has acted 
pedagogically in the past, but this relationship will (or should) no longer be 
asymmetrical. It is or should instead be mutual and reciprocal, meaning that the 
pedagogical relation has dissolved and been replaced by one of friendship or 
mutual attachment.  
• The arena for pedagogical relationships is our everyday life with children, where 
children and adults meet, relate, communicate, and interact.  
 
The aporia and paradoxes of upbringing 
Mollenhauer identifies the process of upbringing as being irredeemably aporetic in 
that it is shot through with perplexity and what might be thought of as paradox. A 
central aporia, perhaps, revolves around the idea of passing on what is deemed 
valuable in the present while, at the same time, recognising that the fruits of that 
endeavour cannot be pre-determined. We do not bring up children merely to live 
comfortably in our worlds, but to change those worlds for the better. We are, in the 
words of Oscar Romero’s poem, ‘prophets of a future not our own’. Yet, and this is 
the paradox, we need to pass on something that we consider to be of value. So, we 
pass on what we consider to be valuable in our world, knowing that this might be 
rejected. An example of this process may be that of parents seeking to bring up 
children in a particular faith tradition. Ultimately, as adults within liberal western 
societies, those children may choose to accept, partially accept or reject their 
religious upbringing, but they, at least, will know what it is they are rejecting and 
what they might put in its place. 
 
If the future cannot be predetermined then nor can the child. We do not, nor should 
we seek to, ‘know’ children. Attempts to ‘know’ them through ever more elaborate 
assessment frameworks and recording tools are ethically problematic (Hardy, 2012). 
The only way we can ‘know’ children is to make them like ourselves, to impose our 
adult ways and values upon them, thus ‘murdering’ their uniqueness and alterity 
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(Levinas, 2000). Pedagogical practice, by contrast, involves “a thoughtful concern 
for the child’s unique person and for the uniqueness of the situation” (Nohl 1970 
cited in Saevi and Husevaag, 2009: 37). Mollenhauer makes a similar point noting 
that: 
 
The pedagogical caring and thoughtful relationship between the adult and child 
gets its intrinsic life and energy from the tension of the opposite: the utter 
uniqueness and inaccessibility of the child’s self and lifeworld. Paradoxically this 
is the pedagogical opportunity that renders possible the pedagogical relationship 
(1983: 35).  
 
A further aporia, this time at a more systemic level, is of relevance to the current 
growth of interest in social pedagogy at political and professional levels. Much of 
this interest is predicated upon assumptions that outcomes for children are better in 
societies where social pedagogy underpins child care practice. This belief, however, 
belies particular assumptions of cause and effect, assuming that if we intervene with 
a particular proven treatment model we might expect better outcomes. Social 
pedagogy, however, does not work that way; it is at its most useful when it is not 
pinned down to positivist assumptions of cause and effect but when it remains 
elusive and contingent – once brought to heel it loses its potency as a dynamic and 
potentially unsettling force in society. Or, as Mollenhauer says: “The more finely the 
net of pedagogical strategies and institutions is woven, the greater a contribution that 
is expected from pedagogy toward social progress, the more difficult it becomes to 
validate this” (1983: 88). 
 
Care or upbringing? 
 
Over the course of recent work on Mollenhauer’s articulation of upbringing, 
summarised above, I have sought to understand how the two, care and upbringing 
might fit together. My initial thoughts were that upbringing ought to be the 
superordinate construct within which ideas of care with their association with nurture 
and domesticity might rest; acts of care fit within the wider task of passing on a 
valued cultural heritage. On reflection I am not sure that this position holds. It 
assumes a version of care that is limited to activities of care giving and receiving, 
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whereas more recent contributions to the literature on care ethics (e.g. Noddings’ 
later work; Held, 2006 and many of the contributions to the Ethics and Social 
Welfare special editions) identify care as a moral theory in its own right, with 
inevitable political and social policy implications. More direct application of care 
ethics to children, however, is limited. That said, I find Noddings (2002) book 
‘Starting at Home’ convincing in its argument that questions of moral development 
and political consciousness have their origins in early experiences of care. In fact, 
much of Noddings’ account of education has strong resonances with the German 
concept of Bildung. What, I think, Mollenhauer’s work adds to the equation is the 
cultural dimension, while social pedagogy, more generally offers a well-established 
intellectual and practice tradition set out in a literature that is beginning to appear in 
English. What care and upbringing share is that both are decidedly not technical 
rational. Magnusson reminds us that “development and growth is a mysterious, 
asynchronous, nonlinear process and dynamic. All child and youth care work aims to 
further growth and change, yet its pedagogy is not interventionist and direct. … 
{but} indirect, cooperative, collaborative and invitational” (2003: XX11-XX111). 
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Chapter Four: Some reflections on the nature of care and upbringing 
 
This review has its roots in an existential curiosity to better understand my own 
experiences of residential child care in the hope that these can contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the field. In some senses, writing the review constitutes a further 
turn of the hermeneutic circle identified earlier, involving a reflection back upon 
what my thinking was at the point of writing the book and the related articles in light 
of what I have learnt since. A central conclusion is to argue that concepts of care or 
upbringing need to be articulated around moral rather than an instrumental ‘or 
‘evidence-based’ rationalities. I group my thinking in this chapter around the 
following headings: divergent rationalities of care; social distance; care and 
upbringing as vocation; a turn to ethics and value rationality and social pedagogy. 
The final section suggests that many of the ideas contained in previous discussion 
might find a place within a Scottish philosophical tradition. 
 
Divergent rationalities of care 
Tronto (2010) argues that public care needs an explicit sense of purpose to set it 
apart from less differentiated family care, where this need is diminished by common 
history. The need for a clear idea as to the purpose of state care is all the more 
important in the context of growing structural inequalities, which result in children’s 
and families’ lives assailed by pressures to obtain the latest, unobtainable, 
consumerist fads and where resultant disaffection and depression is assuaged by 
drugs and alcohol. Into this turmoil, public policy offers ‘rights’ and ‘protection’, 
neither of which are realised and both of which feed into what Webb (2010) 
identifies as the free-floating nihilism of much state care within which adults fail to 
take responsibility for children’s upbringing. 
 
The importance of articulating a concept of care in public services might be thought 
to assume a heightened importance in the wake of the recent report into standards of 
care in Staffordshire Hospitals (Francis, 2013) and in Government reports 
bemoaning the quality of children’s residential care in England (AAPG, 2012). Both 
these sources argue that services need to become more caring but they fail to 
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articulate a convincing case for what care might involve. Indeed, many of the 
prescriptions proposed to address failures in care through further technocratic 
interventions are, arguably, heavily implicated in these failures in the first place. 
What is proposed is more of the contractual regulation that Jordan (2010) argues has 
failed, rather than the moral regulation that is required. 
 
Within a dominant technical rational paradigm, policy directions seek increasing 
recourse to ‘scientism’. In child care this is evident in the turn to neuroscience to 
explain behaviours (see Gerhardt, 2004). This is ‘scientific’ method writ large, 
promising that if only we can find the biological roots of a problem and intervene 
early enough we can then head of difficulties further down the line. It reflects a more 
general ‘biologising’ of what is more appropriately social scientific terrain, offering 
“the comforting possibility of simple solutions to complex problems” (Canter, 
2012:112). “The idea that the brain causes behavior” Canter goes on “is easier to get 
across than the subtler and more complex explanation embedded in learning, 
interpersonal transactions and culture” (2012: 112). Perhaps in an attempt to manage 
its irredeemable uncertainty, residential child care seeks to ‘biologise’ or 
‘psychologise’ and generally instrumentalise the tasks of care and upbringing. These, 
however, cannot be reduced to technique or procedure. In fact, recourse to technique 
or procedure or to a range of ‘technologies’ in work with children avoids “having to 
ask difficult political and ethical questions about the causes of our problems or the 
meaning of success” (Dahlberg and Moss, 2005: 58). 
 
There seems to be a conceptual block in public policy. It struggles to move beyond 
the search for technical rational solutions to policy concerns that are rarely amenable 
to such. It fails to recognise, or if it does recognise it fails to challenge, the 
fundamental problem of attempting to provide relational care within a neoliberal 
political and economic system. Assumptions around care become based upon the 
wrong rationalities. Caring, relational rationalities are different from the economic 
rationalities privileged by neoliberalism (Lynch et al, 2009). Or, as Brannen and 
Moss put it 
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[N]ew capitalism’ calls for individualism, instrumental rationality, flexibility, 
short-term engagement, de-regulation and the dissolution of established 
relationships and practices, caring relationships . . . are predicated on an 
expressive rather than instrumental relationship to others (based on) trust, 
commitment over time and a degree of predictability (2003: 202). 
 
Lynch et al resurrect the term ‘love’ in relation to caring and bring together ideas of 
love, care and solidarity. “The development of love, care and solidarity relations”, 
they argue, “involves effort, time and energy” (2009: 38). It is “not possible to 
produce fast care like fast food. If we go into the McWorld route in caring what we 
will get is not care but pre-packaged units of supervision” (2009: 52). If we continue 
to believe that care can be improved by technical and instrumental fixes then we fail 
to appreciate its value rational nature and consign ourselves to a never-ending cycle 
of flawed interventions. These serve only to compound the primary problem of 
neoliberalism by superimposing layers of bureaucratic (largely regulatory) functions 
to bring some order to its unruly precepts. This constitutes something of a double 
whammy as neither bureaucracy nor neoliberalism can accommodate notions of love, 
care or solidarity, or moral impulse more generally. As Bauman observes, 
“Bureaucracy strangles or criminalises moral impulses, while business merely pushes 
them aside” (1994: 13). Ethics in both are reduced to rules of conduct - in 
bureaucracy these are procedural, in business they are contractual.  
 
Social distance 
Bauman’s writing is persuasive in offering some analytical purchase on the problems 
of neoliberalism. The idea of responsibility and the command to ‘be for’ those we 
work with is a central one. Drawing on a Levinasian account, Bauman argues that 
responsibility needs to be exercised at a personal level, face to face, without 
intermediaries. Bureaucracy, however, builds in intermediaries. Critical relationships 
within neoliberal care are “those between commissioners and providers and 
regulators and providers, not between providers and residents” (Scourfield: 2007: 
171).  Locating care within primarily contractual rather than inter-personal 
relationships has the effect of effacing the face of those social work and social care 
professions work with, creating distance. “Responsibility is silenced once proximity 
is eroded ... the fellow human subject is transformed into an ‘other’ by technical 
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bureaucracy” (Bauman 1989, p. 184). “By this reckoning the plethora of rules and 
regulations that increasingly surround practice are not just minor but necessary 
irritants; they act to dull the moral impulse to care and to ‘be for’ those we work 
with” (Smith, 2011: 3). 
 
The fundamental problem is that dominant thinking misconceives care as a technical 
rational endeavour rather than a value rational one. This takes us back to a Cartesian 
legacy within which thinking is separated off from feeling and where, in intellectual 
and professional traditions at least, thinking is privileged over feeling. Yet, notions 
of care and upbringing involve irredeemably emotional essences. Care is not 
possible, according to John MacMurray, in terms of duty and obligation but must 
emerge as an ethic of love (see McIntosh, 2004). It cannot be seen as a discrete set of 
tasks that can be separated from the relationship in which it is embedded (Lynch et 
al, 2009: 28). It is irredeemably relational. The same authors also pose a challenge to 
current concerns about the outcomes of care, arguing that qualities of care and 
solidarity produce outcomes “that can be seen and felt if not always easily measured” 
(2009: 38). 
 
Care and upbringing as vocation 
Neoliberalism is premised on an image of the person as autonomous and self-
seeking, requiring that their baser instincts be kept in check by layers of legal 
injunction and behavioural codes; we need rules to be moral. Bauman (1993) 
disputes this, arguing that we are not moral because of society. Rather, society exists 
because individuals are moral; they have the capacity to take decisions and to act in 
ways that are oriented to ‘the other’. Human beings are ethical, committed and 
emotional as well as economic, political and cultural (Lynch et al, 2009). These 
observations might take us in the direction of care as vocation rather than 
‘profession’. The call to care requires a purpose other than reward or mere duty. 
Webb (2010) identifies the sense of moral purpose that motivated those who ran care 
homes in the Church of England Children’s Society. A sense of vocation is 
exemplified in Mollenhauer’s call and response dynamic in his explication of 
upbringing and his caution that upbringing should not be turned into a ritualised duty 
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but should be understood as a moral response from adults to children. This is given 
philosophical substance in Levinas’ idea that we are called and reach out to ‘the face’ 
of the other. In the practice domain, organisations such as Camphill and L’Arche 
provide examples of individuals wishing to ‘be for’ those they work with. Such a call 
is not rational. For Bauman: 
 
there is nothing reasonable about taking responsibility, about caring and being 
moral. Morality has only itself to support it: it is better to care than to wash one’s 
hands, better to be in solidarity with the unhappiness of the other than indifferent 
(Bauman 2000: 11). 
 
This, of course, might be thought to raise more questions than answers in respect of 
how a sense of vocation might emerge within a heavily regulated state care 
apparatus, which in many respects regards such ideas with suspicion. There are, 
though, movements across Europe where residential child care is offered in 
intentional communities rather then through state bureaucracies or within the 
marketplace that might serve as models for a different way of thinking about care.  
 
A turn to ethics and value rationality 
Webb calls for a social work that moves away from its current recourse to technical 
rationality and turns towards ethics claiming that “the legitimacy of social work rests 
on exhortations that betray an ethical intent rather than a set of empirical or outcome 
based possibilities” (2006: 8). A turn to ethics might suggest that social work needs 
to grapple with different forms of rationality, specifically, practical and value 
rationalities. Drawing on a broadly Aristotelian perspective, scholars have begun to 
explore the nature of professional knowledge (Dunne, 1993, Carr, 1995, Bondi et al, 
2011). A key topic of debate in this connection is whether the knowledge or 
judgment required for effective practice in the caring professions is reducible to the 
technical ‘evidence-based’ rationality to which professions as medicine have aspired 
(Bondi et al, 2011). The same authors argue that technically rational forms of 
knowledge are problematic in ‘people professions’, where deliberation is inevitably 
implicated in value disputes, taking it into the moral or ethical more than the 
scientific realm.  
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I have drawn on Gadamer’s writing on hermeneutics to justify my epistemological 
position in this submission. Bernstein (1983) maintains that a hermeneutic 
perspective is equally important in praxis-oriented professions where human beings 
are continually engaged in the social construction and deconstruction of their worlds. 
As such, hermeneutics might also be thought to bring with it particular implications 
for the way we might think about social work practice. Clark (2012) proposes that 
rather than falling back on rules or algorithms (or to use Gadamer’s term, method), 
“resolving ethically problematic situations should better be understood as a 
hermeneutic process demanding a repeated and progressive quest to reconcile the 
detailed particularities of the case with complex, competing and evolving moral 
imperatives” (Clark, 2012: 115). 
 
Social pedagogy 
In the sense that it is fundamentally rooted in value rationality, social pedagogy 
offers a more conducive option than social work within which to consider ideas of 
care and upbringing. Social pedagogy, in Pestalozzi’s foundational writing involves 
head, heart and hands (see Bruhlmeier, 2010). It is thus intellectual but also 
ethical/emotional and practical. It also appreciates the divergent rationalities of 
economy and public goods such as care and education. Brulmeier, in his book on 
Pestalozzi contends that: 
 
success in education is determined by different laws than in the economy. If this 
fact is ignored, all reforms degenerate into activity for its own sake. What is 
needed, then, is a change of focus, away from purely organisational, legal and 
financial factors and onto educational aims, practical matters of teaching and real 
everyday problems (2010: 3). 
 
The Scottish dimension 
I mentioned earlier that I am increasingly aware of being influenced by aspects of a 
Scottish cultural and intellectual tradition. Some of this interest was sparked by 
Tronto’s (1993) discussion of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers as a precursor to 
her work on care ethics. A feature of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy was its 
focus on human connections and of man (sic) as a human animal. This is evident in 
Hutcheson’s notion of benevolence, Smith’s sympathy and Hume’s moral sentiment 
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(see Tronto, 1993). The emotional component to human nature posed a challenge to 
Kantian rationality. Hume, for instance argued that “Reason is wholly inactive, and 
can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals” 
(Treatise: unpaginated). Bauman’s arguments as to the irrationality of moral impulse 
thus chime with Hume’s work. 
  
At another level, that of epistemology, Scottish philosophers considered that the 
specialisation of knowledge led to excessive compartmentalisation and atomisation 
in society (Davie, 1991). Knowledge was to be grounded and contextualised rather 
than abstract and codified. The branch of common sense philosophy, which was 
influential in 18th and early 19th century Scotland posits that “the basis of 
knowledge and objective science isn’t simply experimentation or observation in 
regard to bodies and behaviour, but the instinctive and fundamental fact of the 
conscious intellectual rapport between the members of a given society” (Davie 1991: 
65). 
 
These strands of thought stressing, human connection and scepticism towards 
scientific rationality are continued into the last century. Scottish human relations 
theorists, Suttie, Fairbairn and Sutherland, understood attachment as being 
essentially social rather than the primarily biological and ethological drive identified 
by Bowlby (see Miller, 2008). The presence of the other within human relations 
thought is identified as an end in itself, rather than a means to an end such as the 
management of anxiety, as might be interpreted from more biologically based 
models. Running alongside these identifiably Scottish interpretations of attachment 
theory, John MacMurray’s philosophical writing identifies us as ‘persons in relation’ 
(see McIntosh, 2004; Kirkwood, 2012). 
 
These ideas all demand further explication and provide a basis upon which to 
consider further work. Some initial directions for this are outlined in the next section. 
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Directions of future work 
 
The process of writing this critical review has been helpful in chrystallising some of 
my thinking and in setting an agenda for future work. 
The concept of upbringing is, I believe, an important and fruitful one and one that is 
largely unexplored in an English-speaking context. I aim to develop my writing on 
this, in a UK context but also, through CUSP, in a European context. Having began a 
theoretical exposition, an obvious next step is to explore the concept of upbringing 
empirically through seeking research funding to try and work out how carers actually 
go about the day to day task of bringing up children. A specific focus of this work, 
applying to a range of care settings including residential and foster care would be to 
address the question of how the everyday might be rendered or understood as 
professional? 
One avenue for development in this respect might suggest an examination of the 
nature of professional knowledge in the specific context of care. Much current 
understanding of care is based on what I would argue is a flawed epistemological 
premise, which regards knowledge and practice as technical/rational rather than 
practical/moral. Writing this review has helped me better conceptualise this 
disjunction. I am intrigued by the manner in which seemingly disparate strands of my 
interests, on further reading, seem to converge around certain writers and ideas. 
These, invariably, have some connection back to Aristotle. Thus, Gadamer falls back 
on Aristotle and Flyvbjerg draws on Gadamer. Gadamer also writes about Bildung, 
which is, of course, a central concept in social pedagogy. What seems to hold all of 
these threads together is an understanding of knowledge as being different to the 
Cartesian and Kantian Enlightenment ideal of it being abstracted from emotion and 
rooted in reason. And this is where some of the Scottish connections come in. Hume, 
presciently, identified knowledge as but the slave of the passions. Tronto looks to the 
Scottish thinkers for an alternative to Kant’s predominance in wider Enlightenment 
philosophy. MacMurray challenges Cartesian dualism, placing the person in relation 
at the heart of human existence. Recent work on professional wisdom (e.g. Bondi et 
al, 2011) begins to develop alternative conceptualisations of practical rather than 
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abstract and objective knowledge while Flyvbjerg’s articulation of phronetic social 
science offers a model through which to bring value rational knowledge to the 
research endeavour. Education scholars (e.g. Fielding, 2011) are turning to the work 
of MacMurray. However, social work in general but residential child care in 
particular is nowhere near even being aware of these major philosophical and 
epistemological directions and is stuck in unproductive and, I might argue, at times 
unethical technical rationality. I would want to begin to introduce some dissonance 
to dominant ways of thinking and knowing about care and upbringing in general but 
particularly in relation to residential child care. A starting point might be to reprise 
the Wardaugh and Wilding (1993) article, detailing present day corruptions of care, 
many of which are rooted in the desire to conceptualise it as technical/rational rather 
than practical/moral and to seek to identify its emotional dimensions as 
‘unprofessional’ 
It will be apparent from this review that the subject of historical abuse both drives 
me to right what I see as the wrongs of wrongful allegations and convictions but at a 
more intellectual level it fascinates me how particular stories can achieve such 
cultural potency in the absence of any convincing evidence. Webster (2005) is 
instructive on this point. He argues that when a particular cultural narrative takes 
hold “(T)here	  is	  only	  one	  way	  to	  undo	  its	  influence.	  This	  is	  to	  document	  how	  the	  
narrative	  which	  has	  achieved	  such	  power	  was	  actually	  created	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
In	  short,	  it	  is	  to	  tell	  another	  story	  -­‐	  the	  story	  of	  the	  story	  (p.	  11).	  When	  I	  set	  out	  
to	  do	  a	  PhD	  the	  intention	  was	  to	  conduct	  narrative	  interviews	  with	  key	  players	  
in	  the	  Scottish	  residential	  schools.	  I	  have	  nine	  completed	  interviews	  and	  intend	  
to	  complete	  more	  (aiming	  for	  a	  total	  of	  around	  15).	  These	  provide	  the	  story	  of	  
the	   story	  of	   residential	   care	  and	  provide	   fertile	  data	   for	  writing	  up	   that	   story.	  
The	   subject	   of	   historical	   abuse	   is	   a	   central	   one	   but	   the	   wider	   project	   is	   to	  
develop	   an	   understanding	   of	   care	   that	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   direct	   experience	   of	  
caregivers. 
A conundrum for me is how to reconcile the need for structural analysis and action 
with personal commitment and connection. Bauman is helpful here in his exhortation 
that social scientists should not be bystanders but should ‘be for’ the poor and the 
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dispossessed. This, perhaps, in a spirit of reflexivity, takes me back full circle to my 
Catholic roots. Catholic Social Teaching (CST), the Church’s ‘best kept secret’, is in 
the wake of the banking crisis, attracting political and secular interest. Writing this 
account prompted me to explore CST enough to know that it provides a coherent 
body of thinking about the human condition meriting further exposition and with 
much to offer the caring professions. I expect a growth of writing in this field and 
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